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I. Introduction
The objective of reform in Central and East European (CEE) countries was building up stable, competitive, outward looking capitalist economies. While the challenge of transforming the system built up over forty and more years of central planning was formidable, yet, speed was of essence, and CEE countries hastened to build up systems and institutions of market capitalism. In 1989, the Polish economy was dominated by the state, largely closed to the outside world, deprived of external and internal competition and ridden with misleading prices. There was near hyper inflation, and chronic shortages of goods. The difficult initial conditions dictated a more dramatic strategy in Poland than in many other CEE countries --there was urgent need to swiftly stabilise the economy, liberalise and begin to transform institutionally.
The first post communist government, elected in 1989 addressed the crisis with the Balcerowicz plan launched in January, 1990 . There were a number of components in the reform package. Macro economic stabilisation and fiscal reforms were urgent and unavoidable. It was necessary to establish a proper legal framework for private sector activities, to define property rights over assets, and re-enact contract law and bankruptcy law. Liberalisation and deregulation involved freeing prices, allowing establishment of firms by private agents at will, and deregulating domestic and foreign trade. The more difficult tasks were privatisation --of firms, land, housing, social assets; and deconcentration in order to foster competition in markets.
In only 6 years, Poland had turned to a 'success' story. Growth had picked up, the hyper inflation was conquered, and most of the economy was privately owned. Closer study of different aspects of this impressive transformation is warranted: our focus in this paper is on one of the main thrusts of the reforms above --the transformation of the structure of Polish industry.
Structural reform of industrial organisation encompassed change in ownership structure as well as size structure. The state's near monopoly built up in the socialist years was to be dissipated. Milanovic (1989) reports that in 1985 the state sector accounted for 82% of output (compared to 11% in UK in 1978) and 72% of employment (8% in the UK in 1978). Heavy manufacturing was highly pronounced in the industrial structure, and concentrated size structures facilitated state control. It was considered essential to disperse ownership among private agents who would respond faster and better to incentives as well as budget constraints. Alongside, the size structure in industry was to be reformed to reduce the market power of large established enterprises. Binczak (1992) reports that in 1987, of 825 markets (corresponding in level of aggregation to 4 digit SIC) studied by the Anti-monopoly agency, in 72%, the market share of the 3 largest firms were more than 50%; and in an astonishing 93%, the market share of the 3 largest were over 25%.
Privatisation and deconcentration were to be achieved by a three pronged strategy. State enterprises were to be privatised on one hand, and on the other, the larger ones were to be broken up into smaller viable units. Encouraging entry by private firms would allow new starts to emerge and in course of time erode the dominance of large firms. Alongside, the increased role of market forces, from within the economy as well as without, was considered crucial to the evolutionary process. Enhanced competition would drive some firms to exit or contract, others to enter and expand. These microeconomic effects of competition would steer the size structure of enterprises to an equilibrium, albeit slowly. In this paper we examine this evolution empirically. In section 2 we review some evidence on post big-bang enterprise dynamics. Section 3 outlines the method we use to study the dynamics of concentration, section 4 discusses the data, and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
II. Competitive Shocks, Enterprise Dynamics and Concentration in Transition
The Law of economic activity (1989) Internal liberalisation (entry, exit, prices) and external liberalisation (foreign trade and foreign direct investment) invigorated enterprise dynamics. There was considerable job creation, job destruction and job reallocation within as well as across sectors (Konings et. al., 1996) . Though the private sector mushroomed, with entry exceeding exit, entrants were characterised by diminutive scales. Despite adverse shocks, the state sector remained huge in relative terms.
Alongside changing ownership structure, changing industrial structure was a significant transition related process, propelled by demand patterns newly expressed in markets, that required some branches of industry to grow and others to contract, through start ups, growth, contraction and retirement of enterprises in different industries --respecting industry specific technologies and scales. Thus ownership restructuring, industrial restructuring, as well as size restructuring occurred through accelerated processes of enterprise dynamics --birth, growth; contraction and exit. These processes were extensive and contemporaneous, and while some of these would have increased industrial concentration, others would have decreased it.
One feature that has been documented before is worth emphasis. While the radical package of measures was fruitful in quickly stopping hyper inflation and in eliminating shortages, many salvageable enterprises withered under shock therapy, managements unable to cope. In a comparative study, Estrin, Gelb and Singh (1995) (1993) report. Among large SOEs, 160 were privatised through the equity market, either through initial public offerings or direct sale of shares to foreign and domestic investors. More than half the capital privatisation projects involved foreign capital, and these firms in particular show very good economic performance, with serious restructuring process underway (Dabrowski, 1994; Blaszczyk, 1994) .
A direct consequence of the above set of facts provides the focus for our empirical work. If some large enterprises restructured and endured, while other large enterprises went under or wilted, and if in addition, new private enterprises entered at tiny scales, it is likely that large enterprises who successfully transfigured themselves increased their dominance, and their capability to dominate future evolution of industrial structure. We will see in section III that this is indeed true.
2 Fingleton et. al. (1996) report, quoting Bouin and Grosfeld (1994) , that between 1989 and 1993, employment has been reduced by as much as 37% among large enterprises in Poland when output fell on average by 40%. 449 (5.3% of total number) SOEs were liquidated under bankruptcy law. In addition, assets of 1358 (16% ) SOEs were sold off to third parties in public bidding by auction.
II(2) Applicable theoretical model
The theoretical model in industrial organisation closest in applicability to this situation is Sutton's (1991) model of lowest feasible bounds on concentration. Sutton's model is a two period model of entry driven concentration, intended to explain heterogeneity in observed concentration levels across industries. The model relates the lowest feasible bound on concentration in a market to both the level of sunk cost (relative to the size of the market) that must be incurred in the first stage by a firm to compete in it, and the toughness of the price competition in the second stage.
Entry in the first stage is conditioned on anticipated (exogenous) toughness of price competition. It follows that in markets where tougher price competition is anticipated, the lowest sustainable bound on concentration is higher.
A dynamic interpretation of this model suggests that over transition, as an industry moves into equilibrium, increases in concentration may be observed. External and internal liberalisation clearly increases the toughness of price competition; this can be expected to increase the lowest bound on concentration, and thereby, observed concentration. In Sutton's model firms anticipate the toughness of price competition and therefore first period entry as rational. In transition, the increase in concentration is likely to be driven by exit of relatively large firms, if the sudden increase in toughness of price competition does not allow all incumbents time to adjust. Some enterprises might be driven to exit, lacking time to adjust. Such increases in concentration, even when they are part of the move to a new equilibrium, may have adverse welfare consequences. Even though rivalry can be fierce with relatively small numbers of firms, evidence suggests that this type of increase in concentration is a cause for concern. Lubbe (1991) reports that large Polish state enterprises --particularly in producer goods industries which were less exposed to direct import competition --were able to raise prices after the big bang of January, 1990, despite strong deflationary pressures of stabilisation. Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993) find that there was a correlation between the increase in cumulative producers prices in 1989-1992, and the numbers of highly profitable enterprises in those industries.
The gainers were those who operated in highly concentrated industries. Carlin et. al. (1995) report a number of cases where existing enterprises used dominant positions to increase price or took active steps to eliminate competitors. It is clear why increases in concentration are worrying. Fingleton et. al. (1996) point out that the very nature of transition may retard the development of competitive industry structures, despite liberalisation of prices and markets. New and small enterprises may find their growth impeded by large state enterprises who have greater access to scarce critical assets and credit. Competition policy must be configured to ensure that increased dominance of giant enterprise does not ossify, if efficient and competitive market structures are to develop. Table 1 shows the three firm concentration ratios in Polish industry over 1990-1994. Industrial branches are defined according to the Polish national classification (Klasyfikacja Gospodarki Narodowej : KGN), at a degree of aggregation that corresponds roughly to the 2 digit level of Standard industrial Claffication (SIC).
III. Concentration: Measurement and Decomposition
3 Size is measured in terms of employment --sales revenue is an unreliable measure of size in early transition years; inflation as well as implicit subsidies of various types affected prices hugely. It is notable that concentration rose in 11 out of 23 industries between 1990 and 1991. It is also notable that concentration ratios stabilised quickly and did not change much after 1991 --industries where concentration increased, in general, maintained the higher levels over the subsequent years. This might suggest that size structures adjusted quickly to stable equilibrium levels.
To try and understand the forces driving concentration better, we use the generalised entropy measure developed by Renyi (1961) as a measure of information, and popularised by Hannah and Kay (1977) as a measure of concentration.
where s i is the size share of the ith enterprise.
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Our objective is to trace changes in industrial concentration to the pattern of enterprise dynamics. Even though data on entry, exit, growth or contraction are not available, one can make some inferences about the nature of these processes from the way different moments of enterprise size distributions changed. n a can be expressed in terms of various moments of the distribution (Hart, 1982) ; for example, n 2 can be expressed as:
where N is the number of enterprises, γ 1 is the mean size, and γ 2 is the second central moment of the distribution, and ρ 1 , the arithmetic mean of the first moment distribution. 5 We take an additional step to obtain a direct method to see what really drives the changing concentration in a market. In terms of growth rates:
4 Generalised entropy functions are inverse measures of concentration in a numbers equivalent form. The index of concentration in a given market is the number of equal sized enterprises in an imaginary market that is equivalent to the observed market in the extent of "concentration". The parameter α in n α assigns weight among different regions of the size distribution --higher α gives higher weight to large enterprises. To study dominance, we focus on the large enterprises, and use n 2 (the inverse of the well known hirschman-herfindahl index) as our preferred measure of concentration. See Chakravarty (1995) for a comprehensive discussion of properties of various measures of concentration.
5
The second central moment, γ 2 , is defined as:
The first moment distribution is the frequency distribution that shows the number of employees (employed in enterprises that fall in) in various employment size classes. The arithmetic mean of the first moment distribution is the employment share weighted mean enterprise size, which takes higher values when some enterprises are dominant.
This is also known as Niehans index, and is a measure of absolute concentration. It is the employment size of a `numbers equivalent' enterprise; total industry employment divided by the (concentration equivalising) number of equal sized enterprises. This decomposition resolves concentration change into changes in numbers, mean sizes and other moments. In the transitional period, entry, exit, growth and contraction processes are likely to steer these features (numbers, and moments) substantially, concurrently, and somewhat independently of each other. In determining concentration they may be working in tandem or at cross purposes. Inspection of simultaneous changes in numbers and moments between dates help us to make some inferences about the pattern of enterprise dynamics responsible.
IV. Data
Official statistical systems are certainly not immune to measurement problems, and data reliability is a particularly difficult issue in transition economies. Inflation, as well as implicit subsidies of various types make price dependent valuation of size unreliable in the early transition years. We avoided this difficulty by using employment as the enterprise size variable. Of course, employment size may not capture market power very well. We need to be sensitive to the possibility that leaner enterprises offer greater competition now than when they were overstaffed.
But in Poland worker's councils protected employment to the extent possible (Fan and Schaffer, 1994) . It is fair to say that in general, state enterprises lost employment size only when they were
debilitated by adverse shocks and had no other options. Output was highly correlated with employment size (footnote 2), and employment size will serve to convey a sense of the order of magnitude and directions of change in market concentration.
We use data provided by Glowny Urzad Statystyczny (GUS; Polish Central Statistical Office) on numbers of enterprises (and total employment in them), cross classified by 23 branches of industry and 2 types of ownership in each of six size classes. The data covers only enterprises with 6 or more employees. Six to fifty employees constitute the smallest size class and over 1500 employees the largest. Branches of industry are defined in terms of the KGN classification at a level of aggregation that corresponds broadly to the 2 digit level in SIC 6 . As is common practice, multiproduct enterprises are classified to the sector in which most of their production falls.
The data are coarsely grouped and we worked with three different interpolations for distribution of enterprises within size classes. The upper and lower limits on concentration indices can be found with the two extreme interpolations. The lower limit interpolation assumes that every enterprise in a size class has the average size of enterprises in that class. The upper limit interpolation assumes that within each size class there is maximum concentration, subject to the known average size of enterprises in the class. The intermediate interpolation we use is the split histogram density. 7 This is robust and has the advantage of using all the information in the size interval (Cowell,1995: p161) . Results are discussed below.
6
It must be acknowledged that these are very sketchy approximations of `markets', however, they are the only approximations for which data are available.
7
In size class i, the split histogram density φ(s) is given by the following pair of constants:
were s is the size of the enterprise, f i is the number of enterprises in size class i., µ i is the average size of enterprises in size class i, and a i and a i+1 are the class limits. We have information on the total employment in the largest three enterprises in each industry; this enables us to approximate the size of the largest enterprise in each industry more accurately, and thereby, close the open ended largest size class. We have experimented extensively with different possible closure schemes, and are reassured that the results we report are not sensitive, qualitatively, to the precise level that closes the open ended final class. In this paper we report results for a split histogram interpolation that allows the largest single enterprise in each industry to have
V. Results
Has aggregate concentration declined after the big bang? Table 2 , which presents the main distributional features of the size distribution of all industrial enterprises for the years between 1990
and 1994, shows that there is in fact, an overall increase in concentration over the five years following the big bang, when the focus is on larger enterprises --with n 2 . 8 Over the five years, n 2 fell (concentration increased) by nearly 31%.
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[ Table 2 about here] Table 3 decomposes aggregate concentration change into contributions due to changes in numbers and moments (equation 3). What was driving the increase in concentration? Between 1990 and 1994, the increase in numbers was sufficient in itself for an n 2 growth rate of 148%
(decline in concentration). But growth and contraction and entry and exit were such that mean enterprise size fell, driving n 2 down --contributing -333% to its growth rate (sharp increase in concentration). The second moment fell, signifying exit and/or contraction of at least some enterprises at the large and medium size end, given the deluge of entry at small sizes. The elasticity of n 2 with respect to the second moment is -1 and it contributed 154% to the growth rate of n 2 twice the average size of the largest three enterprises in the industry. Results for other closure rules are available from the authors.
(decline in concentration). It is evident from the above that the contraction of large enterprises was not such that the enterprise size distribution translated downward; that might have reduced concentration. The evidence suggests that after the big bang, some large state enterprises contracted more than others, increasing the relative dominance of those who endured. The flood of private sector entrants have entered at too low a scale, and have not grown enough in this period to challenge the largest survivors.
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Thus there is reason to suspect that the overall result of competition policy has been quite the opposite of deconcentration.
[ Table 3 about here]
V(2) Market Concentration
We now turn to individual industries. Table 4 presents the change in concentration in 23 industries between 1990 and 1993. 12 Concentration increased in 8 industries. Decomposing the change in n 2 suggests a common pattern in enterprise dynamics in 6 out of these 8. Energy and coal apart, net entry was positive (enterprise numbers rose, forcing concentration down); but entry and exit sizes, and growth and contraction of incumbent enterprises were such that there were significant declines in mean sizes (forcing concentration up). The second moment fell, indicating exit and/or contraction of at least some enterprises at the large size end. We discuss the patterns in energy and coal industries at the end of this section.
Nearly all industries contracted despite positive net entry at small scales; this is consistent with the relative thinning of the ranks of larger enterprises. The difference between the 15 industries which had declining concentration over 1990-93, and the 6 with increasing concentration was that in the former, enterprise size distributions translated downwards. There was considerably
11
More evidence in favour of this scenario comes from the growing concentration within the state sector. There is of course, no proper market structure interpretation to concentration within the state sector or within the private sector. But when nearly all the large enterprises are in the state sector, increasing concentration within the sector indicates a relative increase in dominance of the large surviving state enterprises. Since the state sector has a large size share, the increased dominance carries over to all industry. more net entry in the 15 (averaging 46% in growth rate of numbers, against 6% in the 6). Most of this entry clearly was at the very small end --mean enterprise size fell more (-127% in the 15 as against -28% in the 6). However, this was matched by the fall in second moment (size weighted average growth rate of second moment in the 15 was -100% as against -5% in the 6). In the industries with increased concentration, the second moment did not fall enough to match the more modest fall in mean size; in addition, net entry was less. The clear suggestion is that while in the 15, size distributions translated down; in the 6, the ranks of the large were thinned --some large state enterprises appear to have lost size relative to others, increasing the dominance of those who endured.
It is instructive to examine changes in concentration between successive years. Between 1990 and 1991, n 2 fell in 8 industries out of 23, accounting between them for 26% of industrial employment.
13 Decomposing the growth of n 2 suggests the same dominant pattern in enterprise dynamics in these 8 industries --rising number of enterprises, declines in mean sizes and second moment. 14 Between 1991 and 1992, concentration increased (n 2 fell) in 14 industries, accounting for 55% of industrial employment. These included the 8 industries which saw increases in concentration in the year just past. 15 Among the 14, all but fuel appear to have followed the same pattern of enterprise dynamics described above. Between 1992 and 1993 n 2 fell in 6 industries, between them employing 26% of the industrial workforce. Five of the 6 had seen increases in concentration over the previous year. The pattern of enterprise dynamics suggested by the decomposition was no longer as homogenous as in earlier years. Coal, fuel and glass and glass products saw increases in the second moment, large firms apparently grew larger.
13
Coal, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, glass and glass products, pottery and ceramics, garments, printing and publishing and `other branches'. 14 The only industry which did not follow this pattern was non-ferrous metals where the second moment rose by a small amount (3.5%).
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It included, in addition, fuel, transport equipment, chemicals, building materials, paper and textiles.
We have not factored in import competition so far. Did imports provide sufficient competitive pressure in the markets where concentration increased? The weighted average growth rate of imports (in current prices) in the 8 industries where concentration increased between 1990
and 1993 was 23%; in the 15 industries where concentration fell, the average growth rate in imports was 101%. The difference suggests two possibilities: either imports were not economically attractive in industries where concentration increased, or domestic producers were capable of withstanding import competition in these industries.
Before concluding we discuss a few individual industries. The most concentrated industries in 1993 in Poland were non-ferrous metals, ferrous metals, fuel and coal (Table 4 , last column). All these industries saw increases in concentration over the four years. Ferrous and non-ferrous metals appear to conform to the dominant pattern of enterprise dynamics among increasing concentration industries discussed above. Clearly, private entrants will have to grow rapidly to challenge dominant state enterprises if concentration is to fall in these industries. Import pressure was moderate --imports grew in current value terms by 23% in ferrous metals and 25% in non-ferrous metals annually. In fuel, the second moment and the mean size both increased, suggesting that large firms might have grown larger, and/or that entry might have occurred at large scales. This is consistent with large enterprises consolidating their increased dominance. Imports grew by 23%
annually. In coal, the second moment rose while the mean size fell. This is consistent with a process of restructuring and rationalisation of the coal industry that reduced numbers and increased sizes of state enterprises. Coal imports were negligible through all the years and had dropped to nil by 1993.
At the other end of the spectrum the least concentrated industries were apparel and food.
Concentration fell in both industries, following similar patterns. The effect of a sharp fall in mean size was countered by rise in numbers and fall in second moment. These industries were particularly attractive to private entrants and had changed fast in ownership structure. Imports had boomed in these sectors, with 38% annual growth between 1990 and 1993 in food, and 52% in garments.
To summarise, the decomposition analysis reported in this section suggests that `premature' exits and significant contraction by some large state enterprises might be responsible for the increased concentration in several industries, subverting the objective of deconcentration, at least in the short run. The most concentrated industries are ones that are generally characterised by high levels of concentration in market economies across the world, as noted by Kennedy (1995) . These are also the industries marked by further increases in concentration and by least competition from imports.
VI. Conclusions
The very obvious result of Polish reforms has been `private growth amidst state collapse' (Rostowski, 1992) . The explosion of private entrepreneurship that followed the Law of economic activity (1989) fuelled hope that private activity would develop rapidly, eliminate shortages and provide competition. Private enterprises have indeed been quick to take advantage of the shifting structure of demand. They have focused on industries where entry at small scales are not a serious disadvantage; and as might be expected, a substantial proportion of private activity has been of the arbitrage type in niche markets ignored by the state sector. More generally, scales at entry have been too low to bring about the hoped for impact on concentration.
Shock therapy overwhelmed state enterprises through major and sudden changes in relative prices, in demand patterns and in import competition. In 1990 the largest state enterprises adjusted minimally and their performance was considered unsustainable. The collapse of the CMEA in 1991 worsened matters. Many state enterprises did not have any opportunity to develop entrepreneurial managements and were constrained to a limited repertoire of simple survival strategies. These enterprises lost size in terms of output and employment, particularly in sectors where technology did not confer great advantage to enterprise size. Early exposure to autonomy and incentives, and earlier privatisation might have encouraged incipient restructuring, and more large and medium size enterprises might have been turned around and salvaged. As it was, only a few enterprises --generally exporters to the west who had been able to weather demand shocks --managed to develop forward looking and dynamic managements who turned them around.
One effect of reform has been to waste away size and numbers from the group of large enterprises. But in industries characterised by economies of scale all enterprises did not suffer equally, and the result has been increases in concentration. If enterprises who gained in relative terms stay state owned, over the longer term they may regain access to state financial support and forestall remedial measures aimed at their dominant and privileged positions. If they are privatised, they are likely to be prove attractive to sophisticated multinational take-over merchants by virtue of their dominance. 16 Competition policy must urgently address the issue of increased dominance in critical upstream sectors of Polish industry. 
